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Abstract
We present a purification result for incomplete information games
with a large finite number of players that allows for compact metric
spaces of actions and types. This result is then used to generalize the
purification theorems of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983) and Kalai
(2004). Our proofs are elementary and rely on the Shapley-Folkman
theorem.
1 Introduction
Mixed strategies are usually regarded as unappealing, either because they
are hard to interpret or because they are considered as too complex for real
players to use them. Motivated by this view, game-theorists have provided
several purification theorems that describe when mixed strategies can be
replaced by (approximately) equivalent pure strategies.
In this paper, we consider incomplete information games with a finite
number of players in which each player’s payoff depends only on his type-
action character and on the average distribution of type-action characters
of the others. Our purification result shows that, if players’ types are in-
dependent and their payoff functions are selected from an equicontinuous
family, then all (Bayesian) Nash equilibria of sufficiently large games can
be approximately purified. More precisely, our result shows that for every
Nash equilibrium of such games there exists a pure strategy approximate
equilibrium that yields approximately the same payoff to all players.
More importantly, our result holds even when both the action space and
the type space are compact metric spaces and not merely finite. This gen-
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erality allow us to readily obtain the purification theorem of Rashid (1983)
as a special case. In fact, Rashid considers the case of singleton type spaces
(i.e., games with complete information) and finite action spaces.
Our result can also be used to generalize the purification theorems of Kalai
(2004) and Schmeidler (1973), which is done by approximating the sort of
games they consider by games in our class. In the case of the complete infor-
mation games with a continuum of players considered by Schmeidler (1973),
our exact purification result requires only that the action space is a count-
able, compact metric space, weakening in this way the finiteness assumption
on the action space used by Schmeidler (1973). In the case of incomplete
information games of Kalai (2004), our result dispenses with the finiteness
of both the type and action spaces by assuming only that those spaces are
compact and metric.
Our approach requires only elementary arguments. We start by establish-
ing a purification result for games with a finite number of players, types and
actions. The proof of this result is based on the Shapley-Folkman theorem
(see Starr (1969)) in a similar way as was done by Rashid (1983). This basic
result is then extended to the general case of games with compact metric
spaces of types and actions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our notation
and definitions. Our purification result for games with a finite number of
players, types and actions is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, this result
is generalized to games with compact type and action spaces. Our general-
izations of the purification theorems of Kalai (2004) and Schmeidler (1973)
are in Section 5; in this section, we also discuss the work by Cartwright and
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Wooders (2005) and those on games with diffused information. In Section
6, we present an example showing that it is not possible to approximately
purify all Nash equilibria of sufficiently large games in which payoffs depend
on the distribution of choices and not just on the average. Finally, some
auxiliary results are presented in the Appendix.
2 Notation and Definitions
In the class of Bayesian games we consider, all players have a common type
space T and a pure strategy space X. We assume that both T and X are
compact metric spaces. Since the focus is on a property that depends on
the number of players, we will index any game by the number of its players.
Thus, Gn is a Bayesian game in which the set of players is In = {1, . . . , n},
and each has T as his type space and X as his choice set.
Players are allowed to choose mixed strategies. In this context, a mixed
strategy for a player is a function from types into a Borel probability measure
on the set of his pure strategies. Let M(X) be the set of Borel probability
measures on X endowed with the Prohorov metric ρ, which is known to
metricize the weak convergence topology. Thus, a mixed strategy for player
i ∈ In is a Borel measurable function σi : T →M(X). A strategy is pure if
its values are degenerate probability measures on X. Thus, if for all x ∈ X,
1x denotes the probability measure on X that attributes probability 1 to x,
then a strategy fi : T → M(X) is pure if for all t ∈ T , there exists x ∈ X
such that fi(t) = 1x. Let Σ denote the set of all (mixed) strategies.
A game Gn is then specified by the vector of payoff functions, one for each
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player. We denote player i’s payoff function by V ni : T
n×Xn → R for all i ∈
In with the interpretation that the payoff of player i is V
n
i (t1, . . . , tn, x1 . . . , xn)
if players’ types are (t1, . . . , tn) and players’ actions are (x1, . . . , xn). There-
fore, a game Gn is described by the vector (V
n
1 , . . . , V
n
n ).
For all i ∈ In, player i’s type is decided by nature according to τi ∈M(T ).
This probability measure, together with a strategy σi : T →M(X), defines
a measure σ˘i on T ×X as the unique measure satisfying
σ˘i(A×B) =
∫
A
σi(B|t)dτi(t) (1)
for all Borel measurable subsets A of T and B of X (see Ash (1972, Theorem
2.6.2, p. 97)).
In this paper we will focus on a special class of games in which each
player’s payoff depends on his type-action character and on the average
distribution of type-action characters of the others. Given a strategy σ =
(σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ Σn in a game Gn with n players, the average choice is:
σ¯ =
∑
i∈In
σ˘i
n
. (2)
Similarly, for all i ∈ In, the average choice of the other players is
σ¯−i =
∑
l 6=i
σ˘l
n− 1 . (3)
Note that both σ¯ and σ¯−i are elements of M(T ×X).
Players’ payoff functions are as follows. To each player i, we associate
a continuous function V ni : T × X ×M(T × X) → R with the following
interpretation: V ni (t, x, µ) is player i’s payoff when he is of type t, plays
action x and faces the distribution µ. Then, for all strategies σ, player i’s
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payoff function is
Uni (σ) =
∫
T
∫
X
V ni (t, x, σ¯−i)dσi(x|t)dτi(t). (4)
We denote this class of games by H and represent a game Gn ∈ H by
Gn = (In, Vn, τn, T,X).
For convenience, let Uni (σi(t), σ−i|t) =
∫
X
V ni (t, x, σ¯−i)dσi(x|t) be player
i’s payoff when his type is t, he plays σi(t) and the other players play accord-
ing to σ−i. As a particular case, we have that Uni (x, σ−i|t) = V ni (t, x, σ¯−i) if
player i plays a pure strategy 1x when his type is t. Using the above notation,
we can write Uni (σ) =
∫
T
Uni (σi(t), σ−i|t)dτi(t).
We let U denote the space of all continuous, real-valued functions on
T × X ×M(T × X) endowed with the sup norm. Thus, we can think of
a game Gn ∈ H as a function Vn from In to U defined by Vn(i) = V ni
for all i ∈ In. Motivated by this remark, we let Vn(In) denote the subset
{V n1 , . . . , V nn } of U consisting of all payoff functions in the game Gn.
For all ε ≥ 0 and strategies σ ∈ Σn let
En(σ, ε) = {i ∈ In : V ni (t, x, σ¯−i) ≥ Vi(t, xˆ, σ¯−i)− ε
for all t ∈ T, x ∈ supp(σi), and xˆ ∈ X} .
(5)
The set En(σ, ε) is the set of players who, for all t ∈ T , assign a strictly
positive probability only to the actions that are within ε of their best response
when all the others are playing according to σ−i.
For all ε ≥ 0 and η ≥ 0, we say that σ is a strong (ε, η) – equilibrium of
a game Gn if
|En(σ, ε)|
n
≥ 1− η. (6)
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Thus, in a strong (ε, η) – equilibrium a fraction of at least 1−η of the players
assign a strictly positive probability only to the actions that are within ε of
their best response. A strategy σ is a Nash equilibrium of G if σ is a strong
(ε, η) – equilibrium of Gn for ε = η = 0.
We remark that this definition is equivalent to the more common one,
according to which a strategy σ is a Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ In and
t ∈ T , σi(t) maximizes player i’s payoff given that the others are using σ−i.
Remark 1 A strategy σ is a Nash equilibrium Gn if and only if
Ui(σi(t), σ−i|t) ≥ max
x∈X
Ui(x, σ−i|t)
for all i ∈ In and t ∈ T .
Proof. Let i ∈ In and t ∈ T . For convenience, let β = maxx∈X Ui(x, σ−i|t).
If σ is a Nash equilibrium, then Ui(x, σ−i|t) ≥ β for all x ∈ supp(σi(t)).
Hence,
Ui(σi(t), σ−i|t) =
∫
supp(σi(t))
Ui(x, σ−i|t)dσi(x|t) ≥ β.
Conversely, suppose that Ui(σi(t), σ−i|t) ≥ β. In order to reach a con-
tradiction, assume that there is xˆ ∈ supp(σi(t)) such that Ui(xˆ, σ−i|t) < β.
Then, there exists ε, δ > 0 such that Ui(x˜, σ−i|t) < β − ε for all x˜ ∈ Bδ(xˆ).
Since xˆ ∈ supp(σi(t)), then σi(Bδ(xˆ)|t) > 0. Hence,
Ui(σi(t), σ−i|t) =
∫
X\Bδ(xˆ)
Ui(x, σ−i|t)dσi(x|t) +
∫
Bδ(xˆ)
Ui(x, σ−i|t)dσi(x|t)
≤ β − εσi(Bδ(xˆ)|t) < β,
(7)
a contradiction.
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Let σ be a strong (ζ, η) – equilibrium of a game Gn. Then, we say that
f is an ε – purification of σ if f is a pure strong (ζ + ε, η) – equilibrium and
|Uni (f)− Uni (σ)| < ζ + ε, (8)
for all i ∈ En(σ, ζ). Thus, under f , all the players that were only using ζ –
best responses to σ−i are playing actions that are ζ + ε – best responses to
f−i. Furthermore, their payoff under f is close to their payoff under σ.
Let K be a subset of U . We say that K is equicontinuous (or, that the
family K of functions is equicontinuous) if for all η > 0 there exists a δ > 0
such that
|V (t, x, µ)− V (s, y, ν)| < η
whenever max{d(t, s), d(x, y), ρ(µ, τ)} < δ, t, s ∈ T , x, y ∈ X, µ, τ ∈ M(X)
and V ∈ K (see Rudin (1976, p. 156)). In our framework, equicontinuity can
be interpreted as placing “a bound on the diversity of payoffs” (see Khan,
Rath, and Sun (1997)).
3 Purification of Equilibria: Finite Type and
Action Spaces
In this section we present a purification result for games with finite type
and action spaces. It says that in all sufficiently large games, all strong
approximate equilibria can be ε – purified, provided that players’ payoff
functions are selected from an equicontinuous family.
Lemma 1 Let K be an equicontinuous subset of U and m, p ∈ N. Then, for
all ε > 0 there exists N ∈ N such that if:
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1. n ≥ N ,
2. Gn ∈ H,
3. Vn(In) ⊆ K,
4. both T and X are finite, |T | = p and |X| = m,
5. ν is a strong (ζ, η) – equilibrium of Gn for some ζ, η ≥ 0,
then there exists an ε – purification g of ν such that ρ(ν¯, g¯) < ε and En(ν, ζ) ⊆
En(g, ζ + ε).
Lemma 1 is our basic result, upon which all the others are based. De-
spite the fact that it implies the purification theorem of Rashid (1983), which
corresponds to the case of p = ζ = η = 0, its proof follows closely Rashid’s ar-
guments.1 As there, the critical result for the construction of the purification
strategies is the Shapley-Folkman Theorem.
Proof. Let ε > 0. Since K is equicontinuous, let 0 < δ < ε be such that
|v(t, x, τ)− v(s, y, µ)| < ε/2 (9)
whenever max{d(t, s), d(x, y), ρ(τ, µ)} < δ, t, s ∈ T , x, y ∈ X, τ, µ ∈ M(X)
and v ∈ K.
Finally, let N ∈ N be such that n > m and 4m2p/n < δ whenever n ≥ N .
In particular, m2p/n < δ/2 and 2/n < δ/2 for all n ≥ N .
1Although the equicontinuity assumption was not made explicit in Rashid (1983), it is
needed as we have shown in Carmona (2004b).
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Let n ≥ N and Gn be a game in H such that Vn(In) ⊆ K, |T | = p and
|X| = m. Let ν be a strong (ζ, η) – equilibrium. Recall that
Vi(t, xj, ν¯−i) ≥ Vi(t, x, ν¯−i)− ζ
for all i ∈ En(ν, ζ), t ∈ T , x ∈ X and xj ∈ supp(νi(t)).
Let t ∈ T and define for all i ∈ In
Si,t =
{
τi(t)
n
ej : νi(xj|t) > 0
}
, (10)
where E = {e1, . . . , em} is the standard basis of Rm. In particular, note that
Si,t = {0} if τi(t) = 0. However, if τi(t) > 0, then (n/τi(t))Si,t ⊆ E.
Note that (τi(t)νi(x1|t)/n, . . . , τi(t)νi(xm|t)/n) ∈ co(Si,t) for all i ∈ In
and t ∈ T since(
τi(t)νi(x1|t)
n
, . . . ,
τi(t)νi(xm|t)
n
)
=
∑
j:νi(xj |t)>0
νi(xj|t)τi(t)ej
n
, (11)
νi(xj|t) ≥ 0 for all j and
∑
j:νi(xj |t)>0 νi(xj|t) = 1.
This implies that
(ν¯(x1, t), . . . , ν¯(xm, t)) =
n∑
i=1
τi(t)
n
(νi(x1|t), . . . , νi(xm|t))
is an element of
co
(
n∑
i=1
Si,t
)
=
n∑
i=1
co(Si,t).
By the Shapley-Folkman Theorem (see Rashid (1983)), it follows that
there are n points αi(t) = (αi(x1|t), . . . , αi(xm|t)) ∈ co(Si,t), with i ∈ In,
such that
(ν¯(x1, t), . . . , ν¯(xm, t)) =
n∑
i=1
(αi(x1|t), . . . , αi(xm|t))
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and
|{i ∈ In : αi(t) 6∈ Si,t}| ≤ m.
Since Si,t = co(Si,t) = {0} if τi(t) = 0, then {i ∈ In : αi(t) 6∈ Si,t} ⊆ {i ∈ In :
τi(t) > 0}. Hence,
|{i ∈ In : τi(t) > 0 and nαi(t)/τi(t) 6∈ E}| ≤ m. (12)
Let Pt = {i ∈ In : τi(t) > 0 and nαi(t)/τi(t) ∈ E}. Define a pure
strategy g as follows: if i ∈ Pt, let ej be such that nαi(t)/τi(t) = ej and
define gi(t) = 1xj ; if i ∈ P ct , choose 1 ≤ j ≤ m such that νi(xj|t) > 0 and
define gi(t) = 1xj . It then follows that
Vi(t, gi(t), ν¯−i) ≥ Vi(t, x, ν¯−i)− ζ
for all i ∈ En(ν, ζ), t ∈ T and x ∈ X.
Note that, for all j and t,
g¯(xj, t) =
∑
i∈Pt
αi(xj|t) + 1
n
∑
i∈P ct
τi(t)gi(xj|t). (13)
Hence,
|ν¯(xj, t)− g¯(xj, t)| = 1
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈P ct :τi(t)>0
τi(t)
(
nαi(xj|t)
τi(t)
− gi(xj|t)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ mn . (14)
By Lemma 12, it follows that
ρ(ν¯, g¯) ≤ m2p/n < δ/2 < ε.
Also by Lemma 13, it follows that
ρ(ν¯−i, g¯−i) ≤ ρ(ν¯−i, ν¯) + ρ(ν¯, g¯) + ρ(g¯, g¯−i)
≤ 1
n
+
δ
2
+
1
n
< δ,
(15)
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for all i ∈ In.
Hence, for all i ∈ En(ν, ζ), t ∈ T and x ∈ X, we obtain
Vi(t, gi(t), g¯−i) > Vi(t, gi(t), ν¯−i)− ε
2
≥ Vi(t, x, ν¯−i)− ε
2
− ζ
> Vi(t, x, g¯−i)− ε− ζ.
(16)
Therefore, En(ν, ζ) ⊆ En(g, ζ + ε). Since ν is a (ζ, η) – equilibrium, then
|En(ν, ζ)|/n ≥ 1− η and so g is a pure (ζ + ε, η) – equilibrium of Gn.
Since ν is a strong (ζ, η) – equilibrium, it follows that |Vi(t, x, ν¯−i) −
Vi(t, xˆ, ν¯−i)| ≤ ζ for all i ∈ En(ν, ζ), t ∈ T and x, xˆ ∈ supp(νi(t)). Hence,∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
j=1
νi(xj|t)Vi(t, xj, ν¯−i)− Vi(t, gi(t), g¯−i)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
j=1
νi(xj|t)Vi(t, xj, ν¯−i)− Vi(t, gi(t), ν¯−i)
∣∣∣∣∣+
|Vi(t, gi(t), ν¯−i)− Vi(t, gi(t), g¯−i)| < ζ + ε.
(17)
Thus,
|Ui(ν)− Ui(g)| < ζ + ε
for all i ∈ En(ν, ζ) and so g is an ε – purification of ν.
4 Purification of Equilibria: Compact Type
and Action Spaces
In order to prove Lemma 1, it is crucial that both the type and action spaces
be finite. In this case, probability measures on their product T ×X can be
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regarded as points in the standard unit simplex of some finite-dimensional
euclidian space, which makes it possible to use the Shapley-Folkman Theo-
rem.
This tool can no longer be used when the type and action spaces are
just compact metric spaces. Nevertheless, as our main result shows, the
conclusion of Lemma 1 still holds: all strong approximate equilibria can be
ε – purified in sufficiently large equicontinuous games.
Theorem 1 Let K be an equicontinuous subset of U . Then, for all ε > 0,
there exists N ∈ N with the following property:
If n ≥ N and Gn = (In, Vn, τn, T,X) ∈ H is such that Vn(In) is a subset
of K, then for all ζ, η ≥ 0 and all strong (ζ, η) – equilibrium σ of Gn, there
exists an ε – purification f of σ such that ρ(σ¯, f¯) < ε.
A standard purification result for Nash equilibria is simply obtained by
considering the particular case of ζ = η = 0.
Corollary 1 Let K be an equicontinuous subset of U . Then, for all ε > 0,
there exists N ∈ N with the following property:
If n ≥ N and Gn = (In, Vn, τn, T,X) ∈ H is such that Vn(In) is a subset
of K, then all Nash equilibria of Gn can be ε – purified.
The method of proof for Theorem 1 consists in approximating games with
compact type and action spaces by games in which these spaces are finite.
In order for this approximation to be useful, it must be possible to map
strategies in one type of game into strategies in the other in such a way that
they preserve their equilibrium properties.
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As our main approximation lemma (Lemma 4) shows, a sufficient condi-
tion for the existence of such mapping is that strategies induce distributions
on T × X that are close in both the finite and the compact cases. The
following two lemmas show how this property can be achieved by making
sufficiently fine partitions of T and X.
The notion of a partition that we use is as follows. Let Y be a metric
space and γ > 0. A γ – pointed partition of Y is a finite measurable partition
{Y1, . . . , Ym} of Y and corresponding points {y1, . . . , ym} such that for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, yj ∈ Yj and Yj ⊆ Bγ(yj).
Since X is a compact metric space, then, for all γ > 0, there is a
γ – pointed partition of X. In fact, let {xˆ1, . . . , xˆm} be such that X =
∪mj=1Bγ/2(xˆj) and define Xj = Bγ/2(xˆj) \
(∪j−1l=1Bγ(xˆl)) for all j = 1, . . . ,m.
The partition is {Xj : Xj 6= ∅}. For all such Xj, let xj ∈ Xj; it is easy to see
that Xj ⊆ Bγ(xj). Hence, the γ – pointed partition is {(Xj, xj) : Xj 6= ∅}.
By the same argument, there is a γ – partition of T for all γ > 0.
The following lemma shows that if two probability measures coincide in
all the measurable rectangles Tl × Xj induced by a γ – pointed partition,
then their distance is no greater than 2γ.
Lemma 2 Let {X1, . . . , Xm} and {T1, . . . , Tp} be γ – partitions of X and T ,
respectively, for some γ > 0. Let µ and ν be probability measures in T ×X.
If µ(Tl ×Xj) = ν(Tl ×Xj) for all l = 1, . . . , p and j = 1, . . . ,m, then
ρ(µ, ν) ≤ 2γ.
Proof. Let D ⊆ T × X be Borel measurable. Let A = {(l, j) : µ((Tl ×
Xj) ∩ D) > 0} and B = {(l, j) : ν((Tl × Xj) ∩ B2γ(D)) > 0}. Note that
14
if (l, j) ∈ A, then (Tl × Xj) ∩ D 6= ∅, which implies that (tl, xj) ∈ Bγ(D).
Hence, (t, x) ∈ B2γ(D) for all t ∈ Tl and x ∈ Xj, i.e., Tl ×Xj ⊆ B2γ(D).
Also, it follows from µ((Tl×Xj)∩D) > 0 that ν(Tl×Xj) = µ(Tl×Xj) > 0
and so ν((Tl ×Xj) ∩B2γ(D)) = ν(Tl ×Xj) > 0. Thus, A ⊆ B.
Therefore,
µ(D) =
∑
(l,j)∈A
µ((Tl ×Xj) ∩D) ≤
∑
(l,j)∈A
µ(Tl ×Xj)
=
∑
(l,j)∈A
ν(Tl ×Xj) =
∑
(l,j)∈A
ν((Tl ×Xj) ∩B2γ(D))
≤
∑
(l,j)∈B
ν((Tl ×Xj) ∩B2γ(D)) = ν(B2γ(D)) < ν(B2γ(D)) + 2γ.
(18)
By Fristedt and Gray (1997, Problem 29, p. 364), we also have that
ν(D) ≤ µ(B2γ(D)) + 2γ and so ρ(µ, ν) ≤ 2γ.
It follows from Lemma 2 that we can control the distance of probability
measures using γ – pointed partitions provided that they coincide on the
rectangles induced by it. Hence, if we want to replace a strategy by another
one in a way that the distributions induced by the two are close, then that
property is certainly useful.
However, we also want to replace a strategy ϕi in a game with compact
type and action spaces with another strategy in a game with finite type and
action spaces. In order to achieve these properties, it is useful that ϕi be
constant in each cell of the γ – pointed partition of T and that the support
of ϕi(t) be contained in a finite subset of X for all t ∈ T .
The two properties above are formalized in the following notion. Let
{(X1, x1), . . . , (Xm, xm)} and {(T1, t1), . . . , (Tp, tp)} be γ – partitions of X
and T , respectively, for some γ > 0. A strategy ϕi is subordinate to {(X1, x1),
15
. . . , (Xm, xm)} and {(T1, t1), . . . , (Tp, tp)} if ϕi(t) = ϕi(tl) for all t ∈ Tl and
l = 1, . . . , p and supp(ϕi(t)) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xm} for all t ∈ T .
The following lemma shows that any strategy can be replaced with an-
other one in such a way that all the desired properties we have discussed are
satisfied.
Lemma 3 Let {X1, . . . , Xm} and {T1, . . . , Tp} be γ – partitions of X and T ,
respectively, for some γ > 0 and let G ∈ H be a game.
Then, for all strategies σ of G, there exists a strategy ϕ such that for all
i ∈ I,
1. ϕi is subordinate to {X1, . . . , Xm} and {T1, . . . , Tm} and
2. ϕ˘i(Tl ×Xj) = σ˘i(Tl ×Xj) for all l = 1, . . . , p and j = 1, . . . ,m.
Proof. Let i ∈ I, l = 1 . . . p and j = 1, . . .m. Define
ϕi(xj|tl) =
∫
Tl
σi(Xj|t)dτi(t)
τi(Tl)
(19)
if τi(Tl) > 0,
ϕi(xj|tl) = σi(Xj|tl) (20)
if τi(Tl) = 0 and
ϕi(t) = ϕi(tl) (21)
for all t ∈ Tl. Clearly, ϕi is subordinate to {(X1, x1), . . . , (Xm, xm)} and
{(T1, t1), . . . , (Tm, tm)}.
Since σ˘i(Tl×Xj) =
∫
Tl
σi(Xj|t)dτi(t) and ϕ˘i(Tl×Xj) = τi(Tl)ϕi(xj|tl), it
follows that
σ˘i(Tl ×Xj) = ϕ˘i(Tl ×Xj).
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The following is our approximation lemma. It shows that we can associate
to any game with compact type and action spaces a game with finite type
and action spaces in such a way that approximate equilibria in one are also
approximate equilibria in the other (with possibly different approximation
levels).
Lemma 4 Let K be an equicontinuous subset of U and α > 0. Then, there
exist m, p ∈ N such that the following holds:
For all games Gn = (In, Vn, τ, T,X) ∈ H satisfying Vn(In) ⊆ K, there
exists a game Gˆn = (In, Vˆn, τˆ , Tˆ , Xˆ) ∈ H such that
1. both Tˆ and Xˆ are finite, |Tˆ | = p and |Xˆ| = m;
2. Vˆ ni = V
n
i |Tˆ×Xˆ×M(Tˆ×Xˆ) for all i ∈ In;
3. If σ is a strong (ζ, η) – equilibrium of Gn for some ζ, η ≥ 0, then there
exists a strong (ζ + α, η) – equilibrium ν of Gˆn such that ρ(σ¯, ν¯) < α,
En(σ, ζ) ⊆ En(ν, ζ + α) and |Uni (σ)− Uni (ν)| < α for all i ∈ In; and
4. If g is a pure strategy strong (ζ, ν) – equilibrium of Gˆn for some ζ, η ≥ 0,
then there exists a pure strategy strong (ζ +α, η) – equilibrium f of Gn
such that ρ(f¯ , g¯) < α, En(g, ζ) ⊆ En(f, ζ+α) and |Uni (f)−Uni (g)| < α
for all i ∈ In.
Proof. Let α > 0 and let 0 < γ < α/4. Since K is equicontinuous,
there exists 0 < δ < α such that max{d(t, s), d(x, y), ρ(µ, ν)} < δ implies
that |v(t, x, µ) − v(s, y, ν)| < γ for all t, s ∈ T , x, y ∈ X, µ, ν ∈ M(T ×X)
and v ∈ K.
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Since X and T are compact metric spaces, there exist δ/4 – partitions
{(X1, x1), . . . , (Xm, xm)} and {(T1, t1), . . . , (Tp, tp)} of X and T , respectively.
Define Xˆ = {x1, . . . , xm}, Tˆ = {t1, . . . , tp} and τˆ by τˆi(tl) = τi(Tl) for all
i ∈ In and l = 1, . . . , p.
Let Gn = (In, Vn, τn, T,X) be such that Vn(Tn) is a finite subset of K.
Define Vˆ in = V
i
n|Tˆ×Xˆ×M(Tˆ×Xˆ) for all i ∈ In and Gˆn = (In, Vˆn, τˆ , Tˆ , Xˆ). Clearly,
properties 1 and 2 in the statement of the Lemma are satisfied.
Let σ be a strong (ζ, η) – equilibrium of Gn for some ζ, η ≥ 0. By Lemma
3, there exists a strategy ϕ such that for all i ∈ I,
1. ϕi is subordinate to {(X1, x1), . . . , (Xm, xm)} and {(T1, t1), . . . , (Tm, tm)}
and
2. ϕ˘i(Tl ×Xj) = σ˘i(Tl ×Xj) for all l = 1, . . . , p and j = 1, . . . ,m.
Thus, by Lemma 2, ρ(ϕi, σi) ≤ δ/2 for all i ∈ In, which implies that ϕ¯−i
is close to σ¯−i. In fact, for all i ∈ In,
ρ(ϕ¯−i, σ¯−i) ≤ δ/2 (22)
since, if D ⊆ T ×X is Borel measurable and k 6= i, then
σ¯−i(D) =
∑
k 6=i σk(D)
n− 1 ≤
∑
k 6=i
[
ϕk(Bδ/2(D)) + δ/2
]
n− 1 = ϕ¯−i(Bδ/2(D)) +
δ
2
.
(23)
By Fristedt and Gray (1997, Problem 29, p. 364), we also have that ϕ¯−i(D) ≤
σ¯−i(Bδ/2(D)) + δ/2 and so the claim follows. Similarly, ρ(σ¯, ϕ¯) ≤ δ/2.
Note that ρ(ϕ¯−i, σ¯−i) ≤ δ/2 implies that
|Vi(t, x, ϕ¯−i)− Vi(t, x, σ¯−i)| < γ
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for all i ∈ In, t ∈ T and x ∈ X.
We next show that the payoff under σ is close to that under ϕ.
Claim 1 For all i ∈ In, |Ui(σ)− Ui(ϕ)| < 3γ.
Proof. Let 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ l ≤ p. Then,∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Tl
∫
Xj
Vi(t, x, σ¯−i)dσi(x|t)dτi − σ˘i(Tl ×Xj)Vi(tl, xj, σ¯−i)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Tl
∫
Xj
[Vi(t, x, σ¯−i)− Vi(tl, xj, σ¯−i)] dσi(x|t)dτi
∣∣∣∣∣
< σ˘i(Tl ×Xj)γ.
(24)
Likewise,∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Tl
∫
Xj
Vi(t, x, ϕ¯−i)dϕi(x|t)dτi − ϕ˘i(Tl ×Xj)Vi(tl, xj, ϕ¯−i)
∣∣∣∣∣ < ϕ˘i(Tl ×Xj)γ.
(25)
Since σ˘i(Tl ×Xj) = ϕ˘i(Tl ×Xj), it follows that∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Tl
∫
Xj
Vi(t, x, σ¯−i)dσi(x|t)dτi −
∫
Tl
∫
Xj
Vi(t, x, ϕ¯−i)dϕi(x|t)dτi
∣∣∣∣∣
< 2γσ˘i(Tl ×Xj) + σ˘i(Tl ×Xj) |Vi(tl, xj, σ¯−i)− Vi(tl, xj, ϕ¯−i)|
< 3γσ˘i(Tl ×Xj).
(26)
Hence,
|Ui(σ)− Ui(ϕ)| <
∑
l,j
3γσ˘i(Tl ×Xj) = 3γ. (27)
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We next show that ϕ is a strong (ζ+2γ, η) – equilibrium. Let i ∈ En(σ, ζ),
t ∈ T, x ∈ X and xj ∈ supp(ϕi(t)). Then,
Vi(t, xj, ϕ¯−i) > Vi(t, xj, σ¯−i)− γ
≥ Vi(t, x, σ¯−i)− γ − ζ
> Vi(t, x, ϕ¯−i)− 2γ − ζ.
(28)
Thus, En(σ, ζ) ⊆ En(ϕ, ζ+2γ) and so ϕ is a strong (ζ+2γ, η) – equilibrium,
as claimed.
Define
νi(xj|tl) = ϕi(xj|tl) (29)
for all i ∈ In, l = 1, . . . , p and j = 1, . . . ,m and so
ν˘i({(tl, xj)}) = τˆi(tl)νi(xj|tl).
Although ν˘i is a measure on Tˆ × Xˆ, it can be extended in an obvious way
to a measure on T ×X by defining
ν˘i(D) =
∑
(l,j):(tl,xj)∈D
ν˘i({(tl, xj)}). (30)
for all Borel measurable subsets D of T ×X. Hence, we can think of ν˘i as a
measure on T ×X.
With the above remark in mind, note that ν˘i(Tl×Xj) = τ(Tl)ϕi(xj|tl) =
ϕ˘i(Tl × Xj). As in inequality (22) above, this implies that ρ(ν¯−i, ϕ¯−i) ≤
δ/2 for all i ∈ In and ρ(ν¯, ϕ¯) ≤ δ/2. Since ϕ is a strong (ζ + 2γ, η) –
equilibrium of Gn, then En(ϕ, ζ + 2γ) ⊆ En(ν, ζ + 4γ) and ν is a strong
(ζ + 4γ, η) – equilibrium of Gˆn. Furthermore, En(σ, ζ) ⊆ En(ν, ζ + α) (since
En(ν, ζ + 4α) ⊆ En(ν, ζ + α)) and ρ(σ¯, ν¯) ≤ δ < α.
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Moreover, since
Ui(ϕ) =
m∑
l=1
∫
Tl
[
m∑
j=1
Vi(t, xj, ϕ¯−i)ϕi(xj|tl)
]
dτi(t), (31)
Ui(ν) =
m∑
l=1
τˆi(tl)
m∑
j=1
Vi(tl, xj, ν¯−i)νi(xj|tl)
=
m∑
l=1
∫
Tl
[
m∑
j=1
Vi(tl, xj, ν¯−i)νi(xj|tl)
]
dτi(t),
(32)
and νi(xj|tl) = ϕi(xj|tl) for all l = 1, . . . , p and j = 1, . . . ,m, it follows that
|Ui(ϕ)− Ui(ν)| ≤
p∑
l=1
∫
Tl
[
m∑
j=1
|Vi(t, xj, ϕ¯−i)− Vi(tl, xj, ν¯−i)|ϕi(xj|tl)
]
dτi(t) < γ,
(33)
for all i ∈ In. Therefore, inequality (33) and Claim 1, imply that
|Ui(σ)− Ui(ν)| ≤ |Ui(σ)− Ui(ϕ)|+ |Ui(ϕ)− Ui(ν)| < 4γ < α
for all i ∈ In, which proves property 3.
Finally, we prove property 4. Let g be a pure strategy strong (ζ, η) –
equilibrium of Gˆn. Define
fi(t) = gi(tl) (34)
if t ∈ Tl for all i ∈ In. Then, for all i ∈ In, l = 1, . . . , p and j = 1, . . . ,m,
f˘i(Tl × Xj) = τi(Tl) = g˘i(Tl × Xj) if fi(tl) = 1xj and f˘i(Tl × Xj) = 0 =
g˘i(Tl × Xj) if fi(tl) 6= 1xj . Thus, ρ(f¯−i, g¯−i) ≤ δ/2 for all i ∈ In and also,
ρ(f¯ , g¯) ≤ δ/2 < α.
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Therefore, f is a strong (ζ + 2γ, η) – equilibrium of Gn since for all
i ∈ En(g, ζ), t ∈ T and x ∈ X, if t ∈ Tl and x ∈ Xj, then
Vi(t, fi(t), f¯−i) > Vi(tl, gi(tl), g¯−i)− γ
≥ Vi(tl, xj, g¯−i)− ζ − γ
> Vi(t, x, f¯−i)− ζ − 2γ.
(35)
Thus, En(g, ζ) ⊆ En(f, ζ + α). Furthermore, arguing as in (33), it follows
that |Ui(g)− Ui(f)| < γ for all i ∈ In. Since 2γ < α, property 4 follows.
Combining Lemma 4 with Lemma 1, it is easy to prove our purification
result.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let ε > 0 and 0 < α < ε/4. Let m, p ∈ N be
given by Lemma 4 and corresponding to K and α. Let N ∈ N be given by
the Lemma 1 and corresponding to K, α, m and p.
Let n ≥ N and Gn ∈ H be such that Vn(In) ⊆ K. Let σ be a strong
(ζ, η) – equilibrium of Gn for some ζ, η ≥ 0. By Lemma 4, let Gˆn ∈ H be
such that |Tˆ | = p, |Xˆ| = m and ν be a strong (ζ + α, η) – equilibrium of Gˆn
satisfying ρ(σ¯, ν¯) < α, En(σ, ζ) ⊆ En(ν, ζ + α) and |Ui(σ) − Ui(ν)| < α for
all i ∈ In.
By Lemma 1, there exists a pure strategy strong (ζ+2α, η) – equilibrium g
of Gˆn such that ρ(ν¯, g¯) < α and |Ui(ν)−Ui(g)| < ζ+2α for all i ∈ En(ν, ζ+α).
Since, En(σ, ζ) ⊆ En(ν, ζ +α), it follows that |Ui(ν)−Ui(g)| < ζ +2α for all
i ∈ En(σ, ζ).
By Lemma 4 again, let f be a pure strategy strong (ζ+3α) – equilibrium
of Gn satisfying ρ(g¯, f¯) < α and |Ui(g)− Ui(f)| < α for all i ∈ In.
Since 4η < ε, it follows that f is a strong (ζ + ε, η) – equilibrium of Gn,
ρ(σ¯, f¯) < ε and |Ui(f) − Ui(σ)| < 4α < ε for all i ∈ En(σ, ζ). Thus, f is an
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ε – purification of σ.
5 Related Literature
In this section we discuss the work of Cartwright and Wooders (2005) and the
purification results for games with diffused information. More importantly,
we extend the purification theorems of Kalai (2004) and Schmeidler (1973).
The generalization of Kalai’s purification theorem is based on a general-
ized version of Theorem 1, which is accomplished by the following general-
ization of our framework.
A class of games G is defined by a sequence of functional spaces {Fn}∞n=1
and a sequence of functions {Fn}∞n=1 satisfying the following properties for
all n ∈ N:
1. if Gn ∈ G, then V ni ∈ Fn and
2. Fn maps (τ1, . . . , τn), (V1, . . . , Vn) and (σ1, . . . , σn) into Rn with the
interpretation that player i’s payoff Uni (σ) resulting from a strategy
σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is equal to F
n
i (τ1, . . . , τn, V1, . . . , Vn, σ1, . . . , σn) for all
i ∈ In.
In the particular case of the class H, for all n ∈ N, the functional space is U
and Fn(τ1, . . . , τn, V1, . . . , Vn, σ1, . . . , σn) = (u1, . . . , un) if for all i ∈ In
ui =
∫
T
∫
X
Vi(t, x, σ¯−i)dσi(x|t)dτi(t).
Let G = {Fn, Fn}∞n=1 be a class of games, Cn ⊆ Fn for all n ∈ N and
K ⊆ U . Then (G, {Cn}∞n=1) can be approximated by (H, K) if the following
23
property holds: For all ε > 0, there exists N ∈ N such that if n ≥ N ,
Gn = (In, Vn, τn, T,X) belongs to G and Vn(In) ⊆ Cn, then there exists
Gˆn = (In, Vˆn, τn, T,X) ∈ H satisfying Vˆn(In) ⊆ K and
|Uni (σ)− Uˆni (σ)| < ε (36)
for all t ∈ Tn and all strategies σ ∈ Σn. The following corollary of Theorem
1 is an obvious, but useful, consequence of the above definition.
Corollary 2 Let K be an equicontinuous subset of U and assume that (G,
{Cn}∞n=1) can be approximated by (H, K). Then, for all ε > 0, there exists
N ∈ N with the following property:
If n ≥ N and Gn = (In, Vn, τn, T,X) ∈ G is such that Vn(In) is a subset
of Cn, then for all ζ, η ≥ 0 and all strong (ζ, η) – equilibrium σ of Gn, there
exists an ε – purification f of σ such that ρ(σ¯, f¯) < ε.
5.1 Kalai (2004)
In order to generalize Kalai’s purification theorem, we start by defining the
class of games he considers, which we denote by K. In this class, the func-
tional space is U for all n ∈ N. We next define Fn.
Let C = T × X, i ∈ In and c−i ∈ C−i = Cn−1. Define a measure
empc−i ∈M(T ×X) by
empc−i(B) =
|{j 6= i : cj ∈ B}|
n− 1 (37)
for all Borel measurable subsets B of T × X. The quantity empc−i(B) is
simply the fraction of players other than player i with type-action characters
in the set B.
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The following lemma shows that if two vectors c−i and cˆ−i are close, then
so will be empc−i and empcˆ−i .
Lemma 5 Let i ∈ In and η > 0. If maxj 6=i d(cj, cˆj) ≤ η, then
ρ(empc−i , empcˆ−i) ≤ η.
Proof. Let D be a Borel measurable subset of T × X. Since cj ∈ D
implies that cˆj ∈ Bη(D), then
empc−i(D) =
|{j 6= i : cj ∈ D}|
n− 1 ≤
|{j 6= i : cˆj ∈ Bη(D)}|
n− 1 = empcˆ−i(Bη(D)).
(38)
Thus, ρ(empc−i , empcˆ−i) ≤ η.
In particular, Lemma 5 implies that the function emp : c−i 7→ empc−i is
continuous, which, in turn, implies that the function c 7→ Vi(ci, empc−i) is
continuous. Hence, if σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ Σn is a strategy, σ˘l ∈M(T ×X) is
defined by equation (1) for all l ∈ In and σ˘−i = σ˘1 × · · · σ˘i−1 × σ˘i+1 · · · × σ˘n,
we can define
Ui(σ) =
∫
Cn
Vi(ci, empc−i)dσ˘(c) =
∫
C
∫
Cn−1
Vi(ci, empc−i)dσ˘−i(c−i)dσ˘i(c).
(39)
For convenience, let
Ui(x, σ−i|t) =
∫
C−i
Vi(t, x, empc−i)dσ˘−i(c−i) (40)
for all i ∈ In, t ∈ T , x ∈ X and σ ∈ Σn.
The following lemma asserts that (K, K) can be approximated by (H, K)
when both T and X are finite.
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Lemma 6 If both T and X are finite, then (K, K) can be approximated by
(H, K).
Proof. We may assume that Vi(t, x, µ) ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ In, t ∈ T , x ∈ X
and µ ∈M(T ×X). Let ε > 0, σ ∈ Σn and i ∈ In. Let 0 < η < min{ε/2, 2}
and δ > 0 be such that |µ − ν| < δ implies that |Vi(t, x, µ) − Vi(t, x, ν)| <
η for all i ∈ In.2 Finally, let N ∈ N be such that n ≥ N implies that
4|C| exp−2nδ2 < η.
Since
|Ui(σ)−Uˆi(σ)| ≤
∑
ci∈C
σ˘i(ci)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
c−i∈Cn
σ˘−i(c−i)Vi(ci, empc−i)− Vi(ci, σ¯−i)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (41)
it is enough to show that∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
c−i∈Cn
σ˘−i(c−i)Vi(ci, empc−i)− Vi(ci, σ¯−i)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 2η.
Note that if c−i is such that empc−i ∈ Bδ(σ¯−i), then
|Vi(ci, empc−i)− Vi(ci, σ¯−i)| < η,
while if empc−i 6∈ Bδ(σ¯−i), then
|Vi(ci, empc−i)− Vi(ci, σ¯−i)| ≤ 2.
Let γ = σ˘−i({c−i : empc−i 6∈ Bδ(σ¯−i)}). By Kalai (2004, Lemma 4), then
γ < 2|C| exp−2nδ2 and so∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
c−i∈Cn
σ˘−i(c−i)Vi(ci, empc−i)− Vi(ci, σ¯−i)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 2γ + (1− γ)η =
= η + (2− η)γ < η + 4|C| exp−2nδ2 < 2η.
(42)
2Since T × C is finite, we may think of µ and ν as a vector in R|T ||X|. Then, |µ − ν|
denotes their Euclidian distance.
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Hence, |Ui(σ)− Uˆi(σ)| < ε.
It then follows from Lemma 6 and Corollary 2 that all Nash equilibria in
sufficiently large games Gn ∈ K can be approximately purified.
Lemma 7 Let K be an equicontinuous subset of U and m, p ∈ N. Then, for
all ε > 0 there exists N ∈ N such that if:
1. n ≥ N ,
2. Gn ∈ K,
3. Vn(In) ⊆ K,
4. both T and X are finite, |T | = p and |X| = m,
5. ν is a strong (ζ, η) – equilibrium of Gn for some ζ, η ≥ 0,
then there exists an ε – purification g of ν such that ρ(ν¯, g¯) < ε and En(ν, ζ) ⊆
En(g, ζ + ε).
In order to generalize Lemma 7 to the general case of T and X compact,
we proceed by approximation.
The following lemma estimates the difference in payoff that two strate-
gies can create if they coincide in the rectangles of some γ – partitions of T
and X. Before we state it, it is convenient to introduce the following nota-
tion. For all V ∈ U and δ > 0, define ω(δ) = sup{|V (t, x, µ) − V (s, y, ν)| :
max{d(t, s), d(x, y), ρ(µ, ν)} < δ, t, s ∈ T, x, y ∈ X,µ, ν ∈M(T ×X)}.
Lemma 8 Let Gn ∈ K, δ > 0, {(T1, t1), . . . , (Tp, tp)} be a δ/4 – partition of
T and {(X1, x1), . . . , (Xm, xm)} be a δ/4 – partition of X.
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If σ and ϕ are strategies in Gn such that ϕ˘i(Tl × Xj) = σ˘i(Tl × Xj) for
all i ∈ In, l = 1, . . . , p and j = 1, . . . ,m, then
|Ui(x, σ−i|t)− Ui(x, ϕ−i|s)| < 2ωi(δ)
for all i ∈ In, x ∈ X and t, s ∈ T such that d(t, s) < δ.
Proof. The partitions {X1, . . . , Xm} and {T1, . . . , Tp} induce a parti-
tion {C1, . . . , Cmp} of T × X. Since ϕ˘i(Tl × Xj) = σ˘i(Tl × Xj) for all
i ∈ In, l = 1, . . . , p and j = 1, . . . ,m, then, ϕ˘−i(×j 6=iCrj) = σ˘−i(×j 6=iCrj)
for all i ∈ In, j 6= i and rj ∈ {1, . . . ,mp}. Let Ξ−i = {×j 6=iCrj : rj ∈
{1, . . . ,mp} for all j 6= i}.
Since∣∣∣∣∫
C−i
Vi(s, x, empc−i)dϕ˘−i(c−i)−
∫
C−i
Vi(t, x, empc−i)dσ˘−i(c−i)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
A∈Ξ−i
∣∣∣∣∫
A
Vi(s, x, empc−i)dϕ˘−i(c−i)−
∫
A
Vi(t, x, empc−i)dσ˘−i(c−i)
∣∣∣∣ , (43)
it is enough to show that∣∣∣∣∫
A
Vi(s, x, empc−i)dϕ˘−i(c−i)−
∫
A
Vi(t, x, empc−i)dσ˘−i(c−i)
∣∣∣∣ < 2ωi(δ)σ˘−i(A)
for all A ∈ Ξ−i.
Let A ∈ Ξ−i and cˆ−i ∈ A. Hence, if c−i ∈ A, then d(cj, cˆj) < δ/2 for all
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j 6= i and so ρ(empc−i , empcˆ−i) ≤ δ/2. Since ϕ˘−i(A) = σ˘−i(A), it follows that∣∣∣∣∫
A
Vi(s, x, empc−i)dϕ˘−i(c−i)−
∫
A
Vi(t, x, empc−i)dσ˘−i(c−i)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∫
A
Vi(s, x, empc−i)dϕ˘−i(c−i)−
∫
A
Vi(t, x, empcˆ−i)dϕ˘−i(c−i)
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∫
A
Vi(t, x, empcˆ−i)dϕ˘−i(c−i)−
∫
A
Vi(t, x, empcˆ−i)dσ˘−i(c−i)
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∫
A
Vi(t, x, empcˆ−i)dσ˘−i(c−i)−
∫
A
Vi(t, x, empc−i)dσ˘−i(c−i)
∣∣∣∣
< ωi(δ)ϕ˘−i(A) + |ϕ˘−i(A)− σ˘−i(A)||Vi(t, x, empcˆ−i)|+ ωi(δ)σ˘−i(A)
= 2ωi(δ)σ˘−i(A).
(44)
Thus, the lemma follows.
The following lemma is the analog of Lemma 4 for the class K.
Lemma 9 Let K be an equicontinuous subset of U and η > 0. Then, there
exist m, p ∈ N such that the following holds:
For all games Gn = (In, Vn, τ, T,X) ∈ K satisfying Vn(In) ⊆ K, there
exists a game Gˆn = (In, Vˆn, τˆ , Tˆ , Xˆ) ∈ K such that
1. both Tˆ and Xˆ are finite, |Tˆ | = p and |Xˆ| = m;
2. Vˆ ni = V
n
i |Tˆ×Xˆ×M(Tˆ×Xˆ) for all i ∈ In;
3. If σ is a Nash equilibrium of Gn, then there exists a strong η – equilib-
rium ν of Gˆn such that |Uni (σ)− Uni (ν)| < η; and
4. If g is a pure strategy strong ζ – equilibrium of Gˆn for some ζ ≥ 0,
then there exists a pure strategy strong ζ+η – equilibrium f of Gn such
that |Uni (f)− Uni (g)| < η.
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As in Section 4, we obtain the purification theorem for games in K with
compact type and action spaces using the corresponding result for games
with finite such spaces (Lemma 7) and an approximation lemma (Lemma 9).
Theorem 2 Let K be an equicontinuous subset of U . Then, for all ε > 0,
there exists N ∈ N with the following property:
If n ≥ N and Gn = (In, Un, T,X) ∈ K is such that Un(In) is a subset of
K, then all Nash equilibria of Gn can be ε – purified.
5.2 Schmeidler (1973)
In this section, we consider games with a continuum of players as in Schmei-
dler (1973). Throughout, we assume that X is countable and T is a singleton,
i.e., there is complete information.
The set of players is the [0, 1] interval endowed with the Lebesgue measure
λ on the Borel measurable subsets of [0, 1]. It follows that, in this case, there
is no difference between the average of all players and all but player i.
A strategy is a measurable function σ : [0, 1] → M(X). The average
choice σ¯ ∈M(X) is defined by letting
σ¯(x) =
∫
[0,1]
σi(x)dλ(i). (45)
It can be shown that
σ¯ =
∫
[0,1]
σ(i)dλ(i) =
∫
M(X)
ιdλ ◦ σ−1, (46)
where ι :M(X)→M(X) denotes the identity and the integrals are under-
stood in the Gel’fand sense (see Appendix A.2).
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A game with a continuum of players is characterized by a measurable
function V : [0, 1]→ U . We represent such a game by G = ([0, 1], V,X).
Let Σ denote the set of all strategies. For all strategies σ ∈ Σ, let
E(σ) = {i ∈ [0, 1] : Vi(x, σ¯) ≥ Vi(xˆ, σ¯)
for all x ∈ supp(σi), and xˆ ∈ X} .
(47)
We then say that σ is a Nash equilibrium of G if λ(E(σ)) = 1.
Define
Ui(σ) =
∫
X
Vi(x, σ¯)dσi(x) (48)
for all i ∈ [0, 1] and σ ∈ Σ. Clearly, σ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
Ui(σ) ≥ Ui(σ˜i, σ−i) for all σ˜i ∈M(X) and almost all i ∈ [0, 1].
The following is our purification result for this class of games.
Theorem 3 Let G be a game with a continuum of players with X countable.
Then, for all Nash equilibria σ of G, there exists a pure Nash equilibrium f
of G such that Ui(f) = Ui(σ) for all i ∈ [0, 1].
This result generalizes Theorem 2 in Schmeidler (1973) simply because
we allow X to be countable and not merely finite.
As in the previous results, we prove Theorem 3 by approximation. In
this case, we approximate games with a continuum of players with games
with a finite number of players. Such approximation is better done using
equilibrium distributions than equilibrium strategies. This explains why we
need X to be countable: essentially, we show that if σ is a Nash equilibrium
of a game G with a continuum of players, then it is also an approximate
equilibrium in sufficiently large finite games. In those finite games, we can
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approximately purify it, obtaining a sequence of pure strategies. Despite the
fact that it is not possible to obtain a pure strategy in G from this sequence,
we can use it to obtain an equilibrium distribution of G. If X is countable,
then we can obtain a pure strategy Nash equilibrium from this distribution
(see Carmona (2006, Theorem 3), restated here as Lemma 14).
We next introduce the notion of (approximate) equilibrium distributions.
Let τ be a Borel probability measure on U ×M(X) and denote by τU and
τM(X) the marginals of τ on U and M(X), respectively. Define for all ε ≥ 0
Bετ =
{
(v, σ) ∈ U ×M(X) : v
(
x,
∫
M(X)
ιdτM(X)
)
≥
v
(
xˆ,
∫
M(X)
ιdτM(X)
)
− ε for all x ∈ supp(σ) and xˆ ∈ X
}
The set Bτ consists of the pairs (v, σ) such that all points x in the support of
σ are within ε of the maximum value for v when the distribution of actions
is the marginal of τ on M(X). Note that Bετ is closed, and so a Borel set;
hence τ(Bετ ) is well defined.
A Borel probability measure τ on U×M(X) is an equilibrium distribution
for a game G with a continuum of players if τU = λ ◦ V −1 and τ(Bτ ) = 1.
The notion of an equilibrium distribution can also be defined for finite
games. It turns out that for the approximation results needed to prove
Theorem 3, it is convenient to work with a modified notion of equilibrium.
Let Gn = (In, Vn, X) be a finite game in H and let pin denote the uniform
distribution on In, i.e., pin(i) = 1/n for all i ∈ In. For all ζ, η ≥ 0, a
Borel probability measure τ on U ×M(X) is a pseudo (ζ, η) – equilibrium
distribution for Gn if τU = pin ◦ V −1n and τ(Bζτ ) ≥ 1− η.
The difference between equilibrium and pseudo-equilibrium distribution
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will be clear once we associate pseudo-equilibrium distributions with strate-
gies with similar properties. Let Gn = (In, Vn, X) be a finite game in H,
σ ∈ Σn be a strategy and ζ, η ≥ 0. We say that σ is a pseudo (ζ, η) –
equilibrium if
|{i ∈ In : Vi(x, σ¯) ≥ Vi(xˆ, σ¯)− ζ for all x ∈ supp(σi), x ∈ X}|
n
≥ 1−η. (49)
It is easy to show that σ is a pseudo (ζ, η) – equilibrium if and only if τ =
pin ◦ (Vn, σ)−1 on U ×M(X) is a pseudo (ζ, η) – equilibrium distribution for
Gn. Furthermore, it is clear what the difference between a Nash equilibrium
and a pseudo-equilibrium is: in the latter, each player computes his payoff
using the average of all players including himself. More importantly, he
assumes that when he changes his strategy, this average will be unchanged.
Formally, the difference between an (approximate) equilibrium and an
(approximate) pseudo-equilibrium is that instead of imposing conditions on
Vi(x, σ¯−i), we now impose them on Vi(x, σ¯). Since in an n – players game,
ρ(σ¯, σ¯−i) ≤ 1/n by Lemma 13 in the Appendix, we can state Theorem 1 for
pseudo-equilibria (here specialized for the case |T | = 1).
Corollary 3 Let K be an equicontinuous subset of U . Then, for all ε > 0,
there exists N ∈ N with the following property:
If n ≥ N and Gn = (In, Vn, X) ∈ H is such that Vn(In) is a subset of K,
then for all ζ, η ≥ 0 and all pseudo (ζ, η) – equilibrium σ of Gn, there exists a
pure strategy pseudo (ζ+ε, η) – equilibrium satisfying |Ui(f)−Ui(σ)| < ζ+ε
and ρ(σ¯, f¯) < ε.
We next turn to our approximation results. The following lemma as-
serts that we can approximate Nash equilibria of games with a continuum
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of players with approximate pseudo-equilibria of games with finitely many
players.
Lemma 10 Let G be a game with a continuum of players and σ be a Nash
equilibrium of G. Then, there exists a sequence of games {Gnk}∞k=1 such that
1. nk →∞,
2. pink ◦ (V, σ)−1 converges to λ ◦ (V, σ)−1 and
3. σ|Ink is a pseudo (1/k, 1/k) – equilibrium of Gnk .
The following lemma is used to draw conclusions for games with a con-
tinuum of players from properties of large finite games.
Lemma 11 Let G = ([0, 1], V,X) be a game with a continuum of players, τ
be a distribution on U ×X satisfying τU = λ ◦ V −1 and ε ≥ 0. Suppose that
{Gnk}∞k=1 is a sequence of games with a finite number of players and {fnk}∞k=1
is a sequence of pure strategies satisfying:
1. nk →∞,
2. fnk is a pseudo (εk, ηk) – equilibrium of Gnk ,
3. εk ≥ ε, εk → ε,
4. ηk ≥ 0, ηk → 0 and
5. pink ◦ (Vnk , fnk)−1 converges to τ ,
then τ is an ε – equilibrium distribution of G.
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The proofs of both Lemma 10 and Lemma 11 are a straightforward mod-
ification of Carmona (2004a, Theorem 1), and are therefore omitted.
Finally, we turn to the proof of Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let σ be a Nash equilibrium of G. Then, by
Lemma 10, there exists a sequence of games {Gnk}∞k=1 such that
1. nk →∞,
2. pink ◦ (V, σ)−1 converges to λ ◦ (V, σ)−1 and
3. σ|Ink is a pseudo (1/k, 1/k) – equilibrium of Gnk .
Let k ∈ N be fixed. Then {V nki }i∈Ink is a finite, hence equicontinuous
subset of U . For all γ ∈ N, let Gγnk be the γth replica of Gnk . Clearly, the
γth replica σγnk of σnk is a pseudo (1/k, 1/k) – equilibrium of Gγnk .
Then, if γk is sufficiently large, by Corollary 3, there exists a pure pseudo
(2/k, 1/k) – equilibrium fγknk satisfying ρ(σ¯γknk , f¯γknk) < 1/k. Let τk =
piγknk ◦ (Vγknk , fγknk)−1; τk is a probability measure on U ×M(X). We may
assume that γknk > k, by choosing γk large enough.
Since τU ,k = piγknk ◦ V −1γknk converges to µ = λ ◦ V −1, it follows that
{µ, τU ,1, τU ,2, . . .}, and so {τU ,k}k is tight by Hildenbrand (1974, Theorem 32
and 33, p. 49 and 50). Also, since M(X) is compact, then {τX,1, τX,2, . . .}
is tight by Hildenbrand (1974, Theorem 34, p. 50). Thus, {τk}k is tight
(Hildenbrand (1974, Theorem 35, p. 50)) and, taking a subsequence if nec-
essary, we may assume that {τk} converges (Hildenbrand (1974, Theorem
31, p. 49)). Let τ = limk τk. Then, by Lemma 11 it follows that τ is an
equilibrium distribution of τU = µ satisfying τ(U × {1x : x ∈ X}) = 1. This
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last property follows since U ×{1x : x ∈ X} is closed, and so τ(U ×{1x : x ∈
X}) ≥ limk τk(U × {1x : x ∈ X}) = 1.
Since τ(U × {1x : x ∈ X}) = 1, restrict τ to U ×X by defining µ(B) =
τ({(v, 1x) : (v, x) ∈ B}) for all Borel measurable B ⊆ U ×X. Clearly, for all
Borel measurable D ⊆ X,
τM(X)({1x : x ∈ D}) = τ(U × {1x : x ∈ D}) = µ(U ×D) = µX(D). (50)
By Lemma 18, it follows that
∫
M(X) ιdτM(X) = µX .
Let
Aµ = {(v, x) ∈ U ×X : v(x, µX) ≥ v(xˆ, µX) for all xˆ ∈ X}. (51)
Hence, (v, x) ∈ Aµ if and only if v(x, µX) ≥ v(xˆ, µX) for all xˆ ∈ X if and
only if v(x,
∫
M(X) ιdτM(X)) ≥ v(xˆ,
∫
M(X) ιdτM(X)) for all xˆ ∈ X if and only
if (v, 1x) ∈ Bτ . Therefore, µ(Aµ) = τ(Bτ ) = 1. By Lemma 14, it follows
that there exists a function fˆ : [0, 1] → X such that µX = λ ◦ fˆ−1 and
Vi(fˆi, λ ◦ fˆ−1) ≥ Vi(x, λ ◦ fˆ−1) for all x ∈ X.
Finally, define f : [0, 1]→M(X) by f(i) = 1fˆ(i) for all i ∈ [0, 1]. Then,∫
[0,1]
fdλ =
∫
M(X)
ιdλ ◦ f−1 = µX = λ ◦ fˆ−1
by Lemma 18, supp(fi) = fˆi and so
Vi(x,
∫
[0,1]
fdλ) ≥ Vi(xˆ,
∫
[0,1]
fdλ)
for all x ∈ supp(fi) and xˆ ∈ X. Hence, f is a Nash equilibrium of G.
We claim that
∫
[0,1]
σdλ =
∫
[0,1]
fdλ. Since∫
[0,1]
σdλ =
∫
M(X)
ιdλ ◦ σ−1 = lim
k
∫
M(X)
ιdpink ◦ σ−1nk ,
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∫
[0,1]
fdλ =
∫
M(X)
ιdλ ◦ f−1 = lim
k
∫
M(X)
ιdpink ◦ f−1nk ,
it is enough to show that
lim
k
∫
M(X)
ιdpink ◦ σ−1nk = limk
∫
M(X)
ιdpink ◦ f−1nk .
This follows since ρ(
∫
M(X) ιdpink ◦σ−1nk ,
∫
M(X) ιdνnk ◦f−1nk ) = ρ(σ¯nk , f¯nk) < 1/k.
Since f is a Nash equilibrium, then Ui(f) = Vi(fˆi,
∫
f) = Vi(fˆi,
∫
σ) ≥
Vi(x,
∫
σ) for all i ∈ [0, 1] and x ∈ X. Hence,
Ui(f) ≥
∫
X
Vi(x,
∫
σ)dσi(x) = Ui(σ).
Similarly, Ui(σ) =
∫
X
Vi(x,
∫
σ)dσi(x) ≥ Vi(fˆi,
∫
σ) = Vi(fˆi,
∫
f) = Ui(f)
for all i ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, Ui(f) = Ui(σ) for all i ∈ [0, 1].
5.3 Cartwright and Wooders (2005)
Cartwright and Wooders (2005) also present a purification result for the
class of games we consider. Although their result is neither implied nor
implies our main result, some comparison can be made. In fact, their result
is weaker to the extent that both their type and action spaces are countable.
However, their result is stronger in the following aspects: their type and
action spaces are not required to be compact, players’ types are not required
to be independent, their continuity notion is weaker than ours and their
purification yields payoffs that are close to the original for all possible types
(and not just in expected value, as in our results).
Our approach is, essentially, topological: once we strengthen Rashid’s
purification result for the finite model (i.e., with a finite number of types
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and actions), we use compactness and continuity to extend it. In contrast,
Cartwright and Wooders (2005) address the purification problem directly
by approximating mixed strategies with pure strategies. Their approach
is important since it provides tools to directly address the countable case,
and yields a purification result which is quite strong along many important
dimensions. However, it seems that this strength needs to be compensated
somehow, there, by placing assumptions on the cardinality of A and T .
5.4 Incomplete Information Games with Diffused In-
formation
Our purification results rely on the fact that every player has a nearly negli-
gible influence on the average. As the case of a continuum of players makes
clear, this negligible influence of each player can be understood as a conse-
quence of an (almost) atomless measure space of players.
Similarly, the purification of mixed strategies can also be obtained with a
possible small number of players when their probability measure over types
is atomless (which can be interpreted as a form of diffused information). In-
deed, such results were obtained by Dvoretzky, Wald, and Wolfowitz (1951a),
Aumann, Katznelson, Radner, Rosenthal, and Weiss (1983), Milgrom and
Weber (1985) and Balder (2002), among others.
Although we have not done it, it seems likely that the approach we have
used to address purification in large games, can also be used in the case of
games with almost diffused information. In fact, a result along these lines
was obtained by Rashid (1985). The reason for such belief relies partly on
the generality of the Shapley-Folkman Theorem, which is the main tool in
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both our approach and that of Rashid (1985).
Indeed, as Khan, Rath, and Sun (2006) have pointed out, many of the
above results can be seen as a consequence of the Dvoretzky-Wald-Wolfowitz
Theorem,3 which, in turn, is an extension of Lyapunov’s Theorem. Alter-
natively, as shown by Balder (2005), we can regard those results as a con-
sequence of the Lyapunov’s theorem for Young measures of Balder (2000),
which is again a consequence of Lyapunov’s Theorem.4 Since this theorem
can be obtained using the Shapley-Folkman as shown by Tardella (1990), it
follows that the purification results for games with diffused information rely,
at least indirectly, on the Shapley-Folkman Theorem.
6 Games based on the Distribution of Indi-
vidual Choices
In this section we show that, in general, it is not possible to approximately
purify all Nash equilibria of sufficiently large games in which payoffs depend
on the distribution of choices. This is so even if T is a singleton.
The games in this section are similar to those defined in Section 2, except
that each player’s preferences depend on his own choice and on the distrib-
ution of mixed strategies chosen by the other players (and not just on the
average).
3See Dvoretzky, Wald, and Wolfowitz (1950, Theorem 1) and Dvoretzky, Wald, and
Wolfowitz (1951b, Theorem 4) for its proof.
4In fact, the Lyapunov’s theorem for Young measures is a consequence of the Extended
Lyapunov Theorem of Balder (2000), which is, as its name indicates, an extension of
Lyapunov’s Theorem.
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We assume that T is a singleton and, therefore, omit t from the following
discussion. A strategy σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) can be thought of as a function
σ : In →M(X). As before, pin denotes the uniform measure on In and, for
all i ∈ In, let pin,i denote the uniform measure on In \ {i}.
Let σ ∈ Σn be a strategy and i ∈ In. The distribution pin,i ◦ σ−1 of
mixed strategies chosen by the all players other than player i is the element
of M(M(X)) defined by
pin,i ◦ σ−1(B) = |{l ∈ In \ {i} : σl ∈ B}|
n− 1 (52)
for all Borel measurable subsets B of M(X). The quantity pin,i ◦ σ−1(B) is
the fraction of players other than player i that choose a mixed strategy in B.
To each player i ∈ In, we associate a continuous function V ni : X ×
M(M(X)) → R with the following interpretation: V ni (x, µ) is player i’s
payoff when he plays action x and faces the distribution µ. Then, for any
strategy σ, player i’s payoff function is
Uni (σ) =
∫
X
V ni (x, pin,i ◦ σ−1)dσi(x). (53)
This class of games is denoted by D.
We claim that there exists ε > 0 and an equicontinuous subset K of the
space of all continuous, real-valued functions on X ×M(M(X)) such that
the following holds: For all N ∈ N, there exists n ≥ N , a game Gn ∈ D and
a Nash equilibrium σ of Gn with no ε – purification.
Let ε = 1/4 and X = {a, b}. Then,M(X) can be represented by unit in-
terval [0, 1] with the convention that y ∈ [0, 1] corresponds to the probability
measure µ satisfying µ({a}) = y. For all z ∈ [0, 1], let 1z denote the probabil-
ity measure on [0, 1] degenerate on z. Let Bc1/4(11/2) denote the complement
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of the open ball of radius 1/4 around 11/2 and define g : M([0, 1]) → R as
follows:
g(µ) =
ρ
(
µ,Bc1/4(11/2)
)
ρ
(
µ,Bc1/4(11/2)
)
+ ρ
(
µ, 11/2
) . (54)
Note that g is continuous, g(11/2) = 1 and g(µ) = 0 for all µ 6∈ B1/4(11/2).
Let W : X ×M([0, 1])→ R be defined by W (x, µ) = g(µ) for all x ∈ X. Let
K = {W}.
Let N ∈ N and let n = N . Define Gn by letting V ni = W for all i ∈ In.
In particular, Vn(In) = K.
Consider σ defined by σi({a}) = 1/2 for all i ∈ In. Then pin,i ◦σ−1 = 11/2
and so Uni (σ) = 1 ≥ Uni (ϕ) for all players i ∈ In and all strategies ϕ ∈
Σn. Hence, σ is a Nash equilibrium of Gn. We claim that there is no ε –
purification of σ. In fact, all pure strategies f satisfy ρ(pin,i ◦f−1, 11/2) ≥ 1/4
for all i ∈ In, from which the conclusion follows since then Uni (f) = 0 and so
|Uni (σ)− Uni (f)| = 1 >
1
4
(55)
for all i ∈ In.
So, it remains to prove that if f is a pure strategy, then ρ(pin,i◦f−1, 11/2) ≥
1/4 for all i ∈ In. For convenience, denote pin,i ◦ f−1 by τ . Let D = {1/2}.
Then obviously 11/2(D) = 1, B1/4(D) = [1/4, 3/4] and τ(B1/4(D)) = 0, since
τ({0, 1}) = 1. It follows that
11/2(D) = 1 >
1
4
= τ(B1/4(D)) +
1
4
, (56)
and so ρ(τ, 11/2) ≥ 1/4.
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A Appendix
A.1 Lemmata
In this appendix, we prove several results needed for our main results. Lemma
12 deals with measures with a finite support. For such measures, we will
sometimes write µl instead of µ({l}), whenever l is a point in the space
in which µ is strictly positive. This notation also suggests that a measure
with a finite support can be thought of as a vector in some Euclidean space.
Roughly, Lemma 12 says that the Prohorov distance between two measures
whose support is contained in some finite set is proportional to their Euclid-
ean distance.
Lemma 12 Let µ, ν ∈M(Y ) be such that supp(µ)∪ supp(ν) ⊆ Ψ, where Ψ
is a finite set. If there exists ε > 0 such that ||τl−µl|| ≤ ε for all 1 ≤ l ≤ |Ψ|,
then ρ(τ, µ) ≤ |Ψ|ε.
Proof. Let ε > 0 and B ⊆ Y be Borel measurable. Then,
µ(B) =
∑
l∈Ψ∩B
µ({l}) ≤
∑
l∈Ψ∩B
(ν({l}) + ε) ≤
≤
∑
l∈Ψ∩B
ν({l}) + |Ψ|ε ≤ ν(B|Ψ|ε(B)) + |Ψ|ε.
(57)
Similarly, we can show that ν(B) ≤ µ(B|Ψ|ε(B)) + |Ψ|ε. This implies that
ρ(µ, ν) ≤ |Ψ|ε.
The following lemma shows that, in large games, the impact of one player
on the average distribution of type-action characters is small.
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Lemma 13 Let σ be a strategy in a game Gn and i ∈ In. Then,
ρ(σ¯, σ¯−i) ≤ 1
n
.
Proof. Let D be a Borel measurable subset of T ×X. Note that
σ¯(D) =
1
n
∑
l∈In
σl(D) =
n− 1
n
1
n− 1
∑
l 6=i
σl(D) +
1
n
σi(D)
=
n− 1
n
σ¯−i(D) +
1
n
σi(D).
(58)
Hence, one easily sees that both σ¯(D) ≤ σ¯−i(D)+1/n and σ¯−i(D) ≤ σ¯(D)+
1/n hold. Thus, ρ(σ¯, σ¯−i) ≤ 1/n.
The following result, proved in Carmona (2006), shows that we can obtain
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium from an equilibrium distribution when the
action space is countable.
Lemma 14 Let G be a game with a continuum of players with X countable.
If τ is an equilibrium distribution of G, then there exists a Nash equilibrium
f : [0, 1]→ X such that τX = λ ◦ f−1.
We conclude this subsection with a lemma used to approximate games
with a continuum of players with games with finitely many players. This
lemma is a simple extension of Parthasarathy (1967, Theorem II.6.3) and is
proven in Carmona (2004a).
Lemma 15 Let (T, T , λ) be an atomless measure space, X a separable met-
ric space, µ ∈ M(X) and K ⊆ supp(µ) be compact. If µ = λ ◦ h−1, where
h : T → X is measurable, then there exists a sequence {µn} in M(X) such
that
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1. supp(µn) ⊆ supp(µ) for all n ∈ N,
2. µn ⇒ µ,
3. limn µn(K) = µ(K)
4. for all n ∈ N, µn = νn ◦ h−1|Tn where Tn is a finite subset of T and νn is
the uniform measure on Tn and
5. |Tn| → ∞.
A.2 Gel’fand Integration
Let ca(X) denote the AL-space of all signed measures with bounded variation
on the Borel subsets of X and Cb(X) be the space of all bounded, continuous
real-valued functions on X. Then, the pair 〈Cb(X), ca(X)〉 is a dual pair
under the duality W (f, µ) = 〈f, µ〉 = ∫
X
fdµ (see Aliprantis and Border
(1999), especially footnote 1 on page 475).
Let (Ω,Υ, ϕ) be a measure space. A function g : Ω → M(X) is weak*
measurable if for all h ∈ Cb(X), the function ω 7→ W (h, g(ω)) is measurable.
Note that if G : Cb(X) × Ω → Cb(X) × M(X) is defined by G(h, ω) =
(h, g(ω)), then that function is just W ◦ G. Hence, if g is measurable, then
g is weak* measurable. In particular, all strategies σ : [0, 1] → M(X) are
weak* measurable.
Let g be weak* measurable. Then, µ is the Gel’fand integral of g if for
all h ∈ Cb(X), ∫
X
hdµ =
∫
Ω
(∫
X
hdg(ω)
)
dϕ(ω).
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As usual, one writes µ =
∫
ω
gdϕ. Note that, by Aliprantis and Border (1999,
Theorem 11.51),
∫
ω
gdϕ is well defined for all weak* measurable functions g
if ϕ(Ω) is finite. In particular, all strategies are Gel’fand integrable.
The following lemma characterizes the Gel’fand integral of a strategy
when the action space is countable.
Lemma 16 Let X be countable and σ : [0, 1]→M(X) be a strategy. If
µ(x) =
∫
[0,1]
σi(x)dλ(i)
for all x ∈ X, then
µ =
∫
[0,1]
σdλ.
Proof. Let h ∈ Cb(X). Then,∫
X
hdµ =
∞∑
j=1
h(xj)µ(xj) =
∞∑
j=1
h(xj)
∫
[0,1]
σi(x)dλ(i) =
=
∞∑
j=1
∫
[0,1]
h(xj)σi(x)dλ(i) =
∫
[0,1]
∞∑
j=1
h(xj)σi(xj)dλ(i) =
=
∫
[0,1]
∫
X
hdσ(i)dλ(i).
(59)
So, µ =
∫
[0,1]
σdλ.
Lemma 16 together with the standard change of variable formula (see
Hildenbrand (1974, Theorem 36, p. 50)) yield the follows result.
Lemma 17 Let g : Ω →M(X) be measurable and α :M(X) →M(X) be
continuous. Then, ∫
M(X)
αdϕ ◦ g−1 =
∫
Ω
α ◦ gdϕ.
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In particular, if α = ι and σ : [0, 1]→M(X) is a strategy, then∫
M(X)
ιdλ ◦ σ−1 =
∫
[0,1]
σdλ.
The following result considers the case of distributions induced by pure
strategies.
Lemma 18 Let X be countable and τ be a Borel probability measure on
M(X) satisfying τ({1x : x ∈ X}) = 1. If µ ∈M(X) is such that
µ(B) = τ({1x : x ∈ B})
for all Borel measurable B ⊆ X, then,∫
M(X)
ιdτ = µ.
Proof. By definition, we have that µ =
∫
M(X) ιdτ , if∫
X
hdµ =
∫
M(X)
(∫
X
hdι(ν)
)
dτ(ν), (60)
for all h ∈ Cb(X).
Let h ∈ Cb(X). Then,∫
X
hdµ =
∞∑
j=1
h(xj)µ(xj) =
∞∑
j=1
h(xj)τ(1xj). (61)
Also,
∫
X
hdι(ν) =
∫
X
hdν. If ν = 1x for some x ∈ X, then
∫
X
hdν = h(x)
and so∫
M(X)
(∫
X
hdι(ν)
)
dτ(ν) =
∫
{1x:x∈X}
(∫
X
hdν
)
dτ(ν) =
∞∑
j=1
h(xj)τ(1xj).
(62)
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Therefore, µ =
∫
M(X) ιdτ .
Lemma 18 has the following application. If f : [0, 1] →M(X) is a pure
strategy and if fˆ : [0, 1] → X is defined by fˆ(i) = x if supp(f(i)) = {x} for
all i ∈ [0, 1], then ∫
[0,1]
fdλ = λ ◦ fˆ−1,
i.e., the integral of a pure strategy viewed as a function from players into
degenerate probability measures over X equals its distribution when it is
viewed as a function from players into actions.
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